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SEX AND GENDER SEGREGATION IN 
COMPETITIVE SPORT: INTERNAL AND 
EXTERNAL NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
PATRICK S. SHIN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
A common credo in modern sports is that athletic competition transcends 
human social difference; within the arena of competitive sport, a person’s 
performance is the only thing that matters.1 But at the same time, in many sports, 
participants are placed into separate classes that are prevented from mixing in 
competition. Adult males do not compete against young boys in weightlifting 
contests; high school varsity teams generally play against other varsity teams; 
boxing matches do not pit heavyweights against lightweights. This kind of 
segregation is presumably uncontroversial. Indeed, some might say that 
competitions among participants of vastly differing capabilities are inherently 
unfair.2 Furthermore, separating athletes into different competitive categories is 
arguably good for sport because it fosters broader participation and allows for 
recognition of accomplishments at multiple levels of capability and performance. 
The separation of men and women in sports is commonly justified by similar 
considerations relating to competitive fairness and promotion of broad and equal 
participation.3 Yet, in contexts outside of sport, sex- and gender-based 
classifications4 are subject to strict social, legal, and moral proscriptions. The 
practice of segregating men and women in competitive sport is so commonplace 
that one might assume that it must be legally and morally benign, or perhaps even 
required as a matter of fairness. Bringing sex and gender discrimination analysis 
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 1.  See Pam R. Sailors, Conceivable Horizons of Equality in Sport, in THE BLOOMSBURY 
COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT 295, 295 (Cesar R. Torres ed., 2014). 
 2.  See DREW A. HYLAND, PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT 62–63 (1990). 
 3.  See id. at 62; HEATHER L. REID, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT 161 (2012); 
Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Sex in Sport, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2017, at 84.  
 4.  The term “sex” is used herein to refer to biological sex, and “gender” is used to refer to gender 
identity or expression. The terms “man” and “woman” are used equivocally to refer to either sex or 
gender. “Male” and “female” are used specifically to designate categories of biological sex. Following 
Doriane Coleman’s usage at a recent symposium (Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Professor of Law, Duke 
University School of Law, Speech at the Law & Contemporary Problems Symposium (Aug. 26, 2017)), I 
use the term “intersex” to name a biological category whose members are neither fully male nor female. 
“Transgender” refers to the category of persons who identify with a gender that does not correspond 
with their actual or perceived biological sex, as well as persons who identify as gender non-binary, 
genderfluid, or agender.  
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to bear might feel like little more than academic contrivance. But controversies 
surrounding the use of sex classifications to exclude athletes from the division in 
which they would choose to compete calls for serious normative examination. 
What exactly is mandatory sex segregation in competitive sport good for, and 
what are the objections to it?  
This article begins to explore these questions from the perspective of a 
commitment to equal treatment and adherence to anti-discrimination principles. 
The article suggests that discussions about the justification of sex segregation in 
sport should be sensitive to two distinct sets of values or perspectives that can 
come into play. One perspective focuses primarily on considerations rooted in 
the ethos of athletic competition. One might say that this perspective emphasizes 
values that are “internal” to the institutions of sport. The other perspective 
focuses primarily on considerations that relate to broader social norms such as 
anti-discrimination principles and notions of equality. One might say that this 
second perspective emphasizes values that are “external” to sport. This article 
explores the justification for sex or gender segregation in sport from both 
perspectives. What this exploration reveals, especially when it reaches the 
difficult terrain of the appropriate treatment of transgender athletes, is that 
solutions that may be consistent with the values that are internal to sport may not 
be acceptable from the external vantage point of equality and anti-
discrimination. It might seem to follow that resolution of the difficult cases could 
be achieved by deciding the extent to which external values should be given 
priority over considerations internal to sport. The rub, however, is that current 
practices of sex segregation in competitive sport are so deeply entangled in 
traditional social conceptions of sex and gender that efforts to change the former 
may tend to have the effect of recapitulating, rather than transcending, the latter. 
The article concludes that institutional decisions about the use of sex 
classification criteria to exclude individuals from participating in particular 
competitions cannot prescind from broader social and moral issues of gender 
discrimination and the meaning of respect for gender identity and expression. 
II 
THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPETITIVE SPORT 
It is fair to ask, at the outset, whether questions of discrimination and equality 
have serious application in the context of competitive sport. One might argue that 
competitive sport is not a significant domain for economic distribution and that 
the use of sex or gender classifications in that context do not really raise concerns 
for ethical inquiry. Adult sport is voluntary, and neither participation nor success 
is necessary for economic well-being or equal standing in other areas of social 
and political life. So why should terms of participation in sport be treated as 
important matters requiring theoretical normative analysis? 
Though voluntary, participation in competitive sport is associated with 
significant goods. Sport is publicly celebrated. It is widely promoted and 
embraced as an important domain of social life from an early age, and it is 
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commonly incorporated into primary and secondary public education. Success at 
the highest echelons of professional and amateur sport can bring money, public 
recognition, and social status. For top athletes, success in popular competitive 
sport can provide access to higher education and, more generally, a visible—
albeit narrow—path for social mobility. Even at amateur levels, success in sport 
can carry enhanced social esteem, and regardless of success (in the sense of 
winning), mere participation can provide social enrichment and contribute to 
well-being.5 
Furthermore, competitive sport has a highly institutionalized character.6 
Even in casual and amateur contexts, a central feature of sport is adherence to 
public rules governing participation. These rules tend to have a constitutive 
quality; that is, the rules of a sport tend to define the sport itself.7 Thus, when 
people care about a sport, they tend to care about its rules. Social value becomes 
attached to the rules themselves, and a sort of reification takes place. Although 
the values embedded in the rules of sport surely mirror, to some extent, those of 
our society, because of sport’s cultural significance and the attachments that 
people develop to it, debates and decisions about the rules governing 
participation in sport have the potential to imprint values back upon society. 
Although participation or opportunity for success in voluntary competitive 
sport might not be thought, a priori, to be an economic good whose distribution 
would be relevant to questions of justice or anti-discrimination policy, the actual 
role and influence of sport in our society makes it an appropriate matter of moral 
and political concern. Given the cultural and social significance of competitive 
sport, there is reason to object to unfairly exclusionary practices in 
determinations of who is allowed to participate, especially in sport’s most publicly 
vaunted forms. There is reason to insist, conversely, that rules governing 
eligibility and participation in sport not be objectionable on grounds of unjust 
inequality or discrimination. 
III 
EQUALITY, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE VALUES OF SPORT 
Equality is usually a reasonable baseline for the appropriate distribution of 
access to social goods and opportunities. One can suppose, at least as a default 
principle, that everyone should have equal claim to the good or opportunity in 
question. From there, one can then explore whether there are reasons to depart 
from strict equality.8 If participation in competitive sport is the good to be 
 
 5.  See, e.g., Sarah J. Donaldson & Kevin R. Ronan, The Effects of Sports Participation on Young 
Adolescents’ Emotional Well-Being, 41 ADOLESCENCE 369, 381 (2006) (reporting results of a study 
finding a correlation in adolescents between participation in sports and well-being).  
 6.  Cf. Sigmund Loland, Fairness and Justice in Sport, in THE BLOOMSBURY COMPANION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT, supra note 1, at 98, 99 (“[S]port competitions can be seen as social practices with 
the institutionalized goal of measuring, comparing, and ranking participants according to performance of 
athletic skills.”). 
 7.  Id.  
 8.  See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 123 (2001).  
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distributed, equality presumably means at least that no one should be deprived 
of this good solely on the basis of status characteristics, including sex and gender. 
As a general ideal, this notion seems uncontroversial. 
What precipitates disagreement is deciding what equal opportunity to 
participate in sport, regardless of sex and gender, should mean in practice. Many 
of the most popular professional and high-level amateur sports organizations 
engage in mandatory sex segregation. Such segregation might be considered 
consistent with substantive equality insofar as such an arrangement may be the 
best way to provide equal competitive opportunities to men and women. This is 
not, however, the only way to see the matter. A critic of current practices could 
argue that sex segregation in sport constitutes sex discrimination9 as standardly 
defined because it entails the exclusion of some individuals from particular 
competitions on the basis of sex: men are excluded from women’s events and vice 
versa. And of course the notion of “separate but equal” is not a justification for 
segregation in other contexts. A strict anti-classificationist might insist, therefore, 
that consistency with anti-discrimination principles requires a rule of sex and 
gender blindness in sport, and that all sporting competitions should be 
integrated.10 Most people might dismiss such a view as implausible, but it is not 
theoretically frivolous. In any event, since sex classifications in other contexts 
tend to carry a burden of justification, it is worth reviewing the arguments for 
rejecting sex and gender blindness as an interpretation of equality in competitive 
sport. 
The basic argument is fairly simple. The problem with applying formal sex 
and gender blindness to the rules of participation in competitive sport is that men 
and women have different capacities in certain areas of physical endeavor.11 If 
separate divisions for men and women were abolished, the benefits of 
participation tied to winning, or having a realistic chance of winning, would 
almost certainly flow primarily to men, as men would dominate all or most 
sports—at least at the elite levels—that emphasize speed, power, or strength.12 
The vast majority of women in these sports would likely never even have a chance 
of breaking into the top ranks.13 It might be possible to separately recognize 
women’s achievements within a given mixed competition, but the need to do so 
only proves the point that women would effectively be deprived of the 
opportunity to be recognized as the overall winner.  
One might argue that the fact that men have natural physical advantages over 
women does not necessarily justify the use of discriminatory classifications. 
 
 9.  For just such an argument, see Torbjörn Tännsjö, Against Sexual Discrimination in Sports, in 
VALUES IN SPORT 347, 357–58 (Torbjörn Tännsjö & Claudio Tamburrini eds., 2000). 
 10.  See id. at 357. 
 11.  See Robinson Meyer, We Thought Female Athletes Were Catching Up to Men, but They’re Not, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/08/we-thought-female-
athletes-were-catching-up-to-men-but-theyre-not/260927/ [https://perma.cc/D34P-FCAZ]. 
 12.  See EMILY RYALL, PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT: KEY QUESTIONS loc. 1452 (2016) (ebook); 
Coleman, supra note 3, at 86. 
 13.  See RYALL, supra note 12, at 1452; Coleman, supra note 3, at 90–91. 
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Making the most of one’s physical advantages, and not being able to win because 
someone else happened to be physically stronger or faster, is surely a part of 
competitive athletics. Not having a chance to win in mixed athletic competition 
might be disappointing for women, but it is similarly disappointing for every 
individual who was not a true contender because of physical limitations.14 The 
argument for creating a separate competition for one physically weaker group 
sets up a slippery slope of endless fragmentation into smaller and narrower 
competition classes.15 
To this argument, one can imagine several responses. One is that the slope is 
not truly so slippery. Sex segregation in elite competitive sport is a longstanding 
practice, and its general social acceptance has not in fact spawned demand for 
divisions along more peculiar lines. Second, even in employment law, sex-based 
classifications are permitted in some circumstances where they are legitimately 
necessary for an essential aspect of the business16; and a sex-neutral rule can 
sometimes be found discriminatory if it has a significant disparate and adverse 
impact on women.17 Analogously, if neutral sport eligibility rules have a 
significant disparate and adverse impact on women’s enjoyment of sport; and if 
sex classifications are genuinely necessary to reflect the different capabilities of 
men and women, sex segregation might not be regarded as discriminatory even 
under a legalistic definition. And third, the argument against sex segregation in 
sport begs the question whether adherence to a formal norm of sex and gender 
blindness should have priority over considerations of substantive equality in 
access to the particular benefits of competitive sport tied to winning or having a 
realistic chance of winning, especially when the approach of sex and gender 
blindness would actually undermine the social value of competitive sport, 
especially for women.18 
There are, then, a variety of considerations that pull in different ways. There 
is a sense that competitive sport is of sufficient social significance that men and 
women should have equal opportunities to benefit from it and that it would 
somehow be unfair not to provide separate competitions for women. But there is 
a lingering worry that reserving separate spaces for men’s and women’s activities 
closely resembles what would constitute discrimination in other contexts; plus, to 
add to the confusion, there is a sense that concerns about equality are somehow 
out of place in competitive sport, which inherently seeks to separate winners from 
losers. 
 
 14.  See Tännsjö, supra note 9, at 352. 
 15.  See id. at 357. 
 16.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e)(1) (2016) (permitting employers to use sex-based classifications 
where sex “is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [the 
employer’s] particular business or enterprise”). 
 17.  See id. § 2000e–2(k) (“An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is 
established . . . if a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment 
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”).  
 18.  See Reid, supra note 3, at 161 (discussing arguments articulated by ROBERT L. SIMON, FAIR 
PLAY: THE ETHICS OF SPORT 136 (2d ed. 2004)). 
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It may be helpful in sorting out this jumble of arguments and concerns to 
distinguish between two sets of values that appear to be in play. Some of the 
arguments invoke values internal to the institutions of sport, while others rely 
more on the broader, external moral considerations that may be relevant.19 
Considerations relating to the equalization of opportunities for men and women 
to participate in and benefit from sport are largely external, in the sense that the 
goal of equalization does not come from within sport itself; competitive sport 
seeks to celebrate certain human inequalities, not to make people equal.20 Values 
internal to sport are those that relate to its defining or constitutive features, such 
as ideals of fair competition, the abilities and traits necessary for excellence, 
winning and setting records, and general notions of what is “good for the sport.” 
External values, like sex or gender equality, might provide reasons in favor of sex 
segregation, while values more internal to sport might generate contrary 
normative pressure. Or the opposite might be true: sex segregation might be 
consistent with the principles and goals of competitive sport, but it might not be 
justified, all things considered, from the perspective of broader social or moral 
commitments that occupy a higher order of priority. Distinguishing between 
these two perspectives will help clarify the basis for arguments in favor of and 
against sex segregation in sport. 
IV 
SEX SEGREGATION THROUGH THE LENS OF VALUES INTERNAL TO SPORT 
Within a framework of values internal to competitive sport, the main reason 
to place participants into sex-segregated competition classes is not that it might 
promote some form of equality, but rather that it helps ensure that competitions 
are as close as they can be. One of the central goals of competitive sport is 
arguably to identify and celebrate the comparative excellence of individual or 
group achievements in various kinds of contests.21 At least part of the point is to 
produce a differential ranking of performance in a particular type of activity—
that is, to distinguish the best from the rest.22 If that is true, then there is little 
value in setting up contests that include classes of competitors who are 
categorically all but predetermined to fare poorly relative to the top contenders. 
This is a consideration that is internal to sport. To claim that mixing participants 
with widely disparate capabilities would degrade the quality of competition is not 
to say that such integration would be morally objectionable or unjust. It is to 
claim, instead, that it would not serve the ends of high-level sporting competition, 
or at least not the particular end of identifying and celebrating top performers. 
 
 19.  Without necessarily accepting his broader moral theory, one can find a helpful discussion of the 
notion of a value that is internal to a practice in ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN 
MORAL THEORY 188–90 (3d ed. 2007).  
 20.  See Loland, supra note 6, at 103. 
 21.  See Mitchell N. Berman, “Let ‘em Play:” A Study in the Jurisprudence of Sport, 99 GEO. L.J. 
1325, 1358 (2011). 
 22.  See Loland, supra note 6, at 99. 
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Another important feature of sport, especially at amateur and casual levels, 
is an ethos that success in the sport should be a result of effort, training, 
dedication to performing to the utmost of one’s capabilities, and the pursuit of 
excellence in the skills and virtues central to the sport.23 A difficulty with sporting 
events open to mixed classes of competitors with widely disparate performance 
capacities is that they betray the idea that results should be a function of 
maximizing personal ability. This implies that competitions should not be set up 
in such a way that outcomes for particular classes of participants are essentially 
predetermined by categorical physiological differences. The notion that results 
should be tied to the maximization of capability within a physiologically 
comparable cohort seems central to the precept of fair competition.24 A contest 
that produces and celebrates winners who prevail over a physiologically 
disadvantaged cohort is inconsistent with values fundamental to the institution of 
competitive sport.25 
On the other hand, separating competitors into classes that are too narrow 
also seems undesirable. There would be little purpose in setting up a contest of 
competitors who perform exactly the same. Part of the goal of competition in 
sport is to elicit and celebrate meaningful inequalities of performance. Some of 
the most celebrated achievements and accomplishments in sports have resulted 
from competitions in which a severe underdog has overcome supposed 
disadvantages to prevail over the heavy favorite. But there can be no underdogs 
or favorites if classes of competitors are too narrowly constructed. Thus, the 
values of competitive sport suggest a need to segregate competitors into different 
classes comprised of athletes of roughly comparable capability, but which are 
sufficiently broad to leave space for the emergence of meaningful and even 
significant differentiation within each class, such as underdogs, favorites, and 
Davids and Goliaths. 
V 
SEX SEGREGATION THROUGH THE LENS OF EXTERNAL CONCERNS  
OF DISCRIMINATION 
The foregoing considerations, limited as they are, are not meant to be 
conclusive. However, they provide good reason to believe that sex segregation 
may be justified from the vantage point of values internal to sport, insofar as it is 
a positive value in sport to avoid placing classes of individuals that are vastly 
disparate in physical capability in competition with each other. This should not, 
however, be the end of the normative inquiry. Even if sex segregation is 
consistent with the values of competitive sport, it may be objectionable on 
external grounds. In particular, one might ask whether reliance on sex or gender 
classifications in determining eligibility for particular competitive events 
 
 23.  See Berman, supra note 21, at 1358.  
 24.  See Loland, supra note 6, at 104, 110; Sailors, supra note 1, at 300. 
 25.  Loland, supra note 6, at 104.  
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constitutes wrongful discrimination.26 
Whether sex segregation in sport constitutes discrimination surely depends in 
part on the definition of discrimination to which one subscribes. The present 
interest, however, is not in the concept of discrimination as such, so it is not 
necessary to argue for or dwell on any particular theory. Rather, the discussion 
below will address whether there are reasons for objecting to the different 
treatment of men and women that could provide grounds for regarding such 
treatment as discrimination under any of the most common theories of 
discrimination. Without attempting to be comprehensive, a few possibilities are 
explored below. 
According to harm-based theories of wrongful discrimination, a crucial 
consideration is whether the differentiating practice at issue—here, exclusion 
from a particular event because of sex or gender status—causes harm to the 
individual who receives the unfavorable treatment.27 What constitutes harm for 
purposes of harm-based theories of discrimination is itself a philosophically 
contested issue.28 Such questions are beyond our present scope, but what seems 
relevant to observe here is that arguments for treating men and women 
differently in sport tend to be based on the expected benefits of a segregated 
regime for all. The intended consequence of creating separate sporting events for 
women is to increase opportunities for women in sport, promote recognition of 
women’s accomplishments, and reduce the risk of marginalization of women 
athletes due to domination of events by men. It might turn out that sex 
segregation makes women worse off in certain ways despite what might be 
intended or expected, but the hypothesized justifications of sex segregation 
provide reasons not to regard the different treatment of men and women in sport 
as discrimination within the meaning of a harm-based theory. 
Another theoretical conception of discrimination—structural discrimination 
—focuses on issues of subordination.29 Does sex segregation contribute to the 
subordination of women in society? Although the explicit rationale for sex 
segregation is precisely the opposite of subordination—equalization of women’s 
opportunities and recognition in sport30—it is conceivable that the practice could, 
even if it succeeded in benefiting women in sports, be counterproductive in other 
contexts. For example, the separation of men and women in competitive sport 
might reinforce the idea that women should be kept in a separate domain for 
 
 26.  Here, discrimination is invoked in a general normative sense and not in a technical legal sense. 
 27.  E.g., KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, BORN FREE AND EQUAL: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 
INTO THE NATURE OF DISCRIMINATION 154–55 (2014).  
 28.  See Richard Arneson, Discrimination and Harm, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE 
ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION 151, 154–56 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2018). On a simple 
consequentialist understanding, the question of harm is ultimately an empirical one, whereas non-
consequentialist views might define harming in terms of making someone worse off in any respect or 
even violating their rights. See id. 
 29.  See Andrew Altman, Discrimination § 2.3, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Feb. 
1, 2011) (rev. Aug. 30, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/discrimination/ 
[https://perma.cc/FD75-APL3].  
 30.  See Coleman, supra note 3, at 85–86. 
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their own good; that women cannot succeed when placed in competition with 
men; that competitions among men are where the real action is; and that domains 
occupied by women are ancillary or nonessential.31 On the other hand, one must 
consider the state of affairs that might result from the elimination of sex or gender 
segregation in sport. Would the expected pattern of results—presumably, 
domination of many high-profile sports categories by men—have negative 
consequences for the social status of women? Dominance by men over women in 
some sports might reinforce broader beliefs that women cannot be equals of men. 
More generally, the sex-based patterns of success that one would expect to result 
from mixed competitions could reinforce and perpetuate harmful societal 
prejudices about the inferior status of women. 
According to a third view, the “expressive” theory of discrimination, whether 
an action or policy is objectionable as discrimination depends on whether the 
action, or its rationale, expresses disrespect or implies lesser moral, political, or 
social standing for members of one group relative to another.32 Does segregation 
based on sex in sport express disrespect for women—or men? It might be 
contended that segregation of men and women in sport expresses a sort of 
dismissive paternalism: respect for women’s achievements and participation in 
sport might be little more than lip service. Furthermore, what is arguably 
expressed by the practice of keeping men and women apart is the idea that 
women should be permitted to enjoy the benefits of sport, but that they must be 
protected from, and prevented from interfering in, the serious rigors of men’s 
competitions. Thus, it is possible at least to articulate an argument for regarding 
sex segregation in sport as problematic according to an expressive theory of 
discrimination. The weakness of these arguments, however, is that they fail to 
take seriously the reality of the physiological differences between men and 
women in elite athletics. The rationale for segregation is not simply that 
separation is in the best interest of women, but that separation is necessary for 
women to have equal opportunities in sport because of their physiological 
differences from men. Far from expressing lesser respect for women, this 
rationale expresses the idea that in order to recognize the equal status of women, 
they should have equal opportunities for access to sport and equal recognition of 
their demonstrated excellence and achievements in the most esteemed categories 
of athletic endeavor and competition. 
Finally, some conceptions of discrimination encompass certain types of 
stereotyping.33 Stereotyping discrimination can be defined roughly as adverse 
treatment of an individual based on a generalized belief about the characteristics 
of the members of some protected group to which the individual belongs.34 Sex 
 
 31.  In some popular sports, women’s competition is designated as such, whereas the men’s 
competition is not so qualified. For example: NBA and WNBA; PGA and LPGA. See Ann Travers, The 
Sport Nexus and Gender Injustice, 2 STUD. SOC. JUST. 79, 83–84 (2008). 
 32.  See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 29, 35–37 (2008). 
 33.  See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235–36 (1989). 
 34.  Cf. Patrick S. Shin, Is There a Unitary Concept of Discrimination?, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 163, 174 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013). 
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segregation in competitive sport may be susceptible to an objection of 
discriminatory stereotyping. The operative stereotype is that women are 
physically weaker, slower, and generally less physically capable than men. One 
might respond that it is in fact true that women do not generally perform as well 
as men in physical contests that reward strength, power, and speed.35 What one 
must remember, however, is that the truth of a generalization is not necessarily 
dispositive of whether reliance on it should be regarded as discrimination. There 
are contexts, such as employment markets, in which the use of certain 
classifications as proxies for domain-relevant characteristics would be 
objectionable as per se discrimination, even if the proxy relation were reasonably 
valid or statistically justified.36 For example, an employer cannot use race as a 
proxy for any job-relevant trait, even if a valid statistical basis for doing so 
happens to exist because of historical racial inequality.37 Much has been written 
about why the law takes this approach.38 One hypothesis is that the use of certain 
kinds of classifications can and should be avoided even if statistically or 
empirically justified when the public legitimization of that classification might 
have negative spillover effects into social domains where reliance on the 
classification is more invidious.39 Despite the truth of the generalizations about 
sex-based differences that putatively justify the separation of men and women in 
competitive sport, one might argue that legitimization of sex as a proxy for 
capability in any context is so potentially pernicious that sex segregation in sports 
should be regarded as impermissible per se. 
The point here is not to claim that this argument, or any of the foregoing 
arguments about whether sex segregation in sport constitutes discrimination, 
should or should not be accepted. Rather, the discussion in this part has sought 
to expose the normative gap between the proposition that sex segregation is good 
for competitive sport and that sex segregation in sport is justified, full stop. 
Closing that gap requires deliberation about how the practice of sex segregation 
within institutions of sport interacts with broader social commitments to sex and 
gender equality and principles of nondiscrimination. 
VI 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONCERNS ABOUT BINARY SEX SEGREGATION 
Another anti-discrimination-based external challenge to current practices of 
sex segregation is an objection not to segregation per se, but to its prevailing 
binary structure. The concern is that the traditional paradigm of reserving men’s 
competitions for persons with biologically—anatomically, hormonally, and 
 
 35.  See Meyer, supra note 11.  
 36.  See Shin, supra note 34, at 175–76. 
 37.  David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 110 (1986). 
 38.  For a discussion of why the law takes this approach, see Shin, supra note 34, at 175–76.  
 39.  This suggestion is somewhat similar to the justification for the application of “strict scrutiny” to 
racial classifications invoked for putatively benign or equality-promoting purposes. See, e.g., Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228–29 (1995).  
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physiologically—male bodies and women’s competitions for biologically female 
bodies excludes, marginalizes, or evinces disrespect for individuals who do not 
satisfy the usual criteria for either category or who identify with a gender that 
does not correspond to their assigned or presumed sex. The most publicized 
controversies implicating this issue have involved athletes with physical or 
biological characteristics associated with being male who competed or sought to 
compete in the women’s category.40 
From the standpoint of values internal to competitive sport, the issue of 
gender identity is for the most part a non-starter. The purpose of dividing 
competitions into separate men’s and women’s events is to minimize the role of 
insuperable physical disparities in determining outcomes. That purpose is served 
by classifications tied to biology or physiology. There would be little point in 
using classifications based on gender or gender identity because insofar as such 
classifications are delinked from biological sex, they would only operate to 
reintroduce the problematic disparities that having separate men’s and women’s 
competitions is supposed to eliminate. Thus, if the goal is to tighten competitions 
by limiting them to physically comparable cohorts, then the notion of modifying 
eligibility rules to take account of gender identity might appear to be rather 
unmotivated. 
The objection to the binary system of sex segregation makes sense only from 
an external standpoint, a perspective that includes gender anti-discrimination 
values that go beyond the values that define competitive sport. And even from 
an external perspective, the objection assumes that there is some general anti-
discrimination principle that requires the equal treatment of transgender 
persons—a principle that says that no one should be excluded from or denied 
participation in any significant social opportunity solely because of transgender 
status or other gender identity or expression. If this assumption is rejected—that 
is, if there is no transgender anti-discrimination principle—then the issue of 
transgender treatment would no longer be a hard question for competitive sport; 
decisions with regard to such individuals could just be based on internal 
considerations, such as what would be best for the robustness of competition, 
overall experience of participation for competitors, and the flourishing of the 
sport in general. 
To explore the harder questions, let us assume that all persons do indeed have 
a right not to be discriminated against because of their transgender status, gender 
identity, or gender expression. One argument that proponents of binary sex 
segregation might then make is that the current system of segregation does not 
deny anyone the opportunity to compete on the basis of sex, gender, or gender 
identity. Requiring a person to compete in a category different from what they 
 
 40.  See generally Nancy Leong, Against Women’s Sports, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 22–31), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2923503 [https://perma.cc/HP7B-BFHB] (identifying 
highly publicized cases of individuals competing in women’s competitions who are then tested for 
physiologically male traits and discussing the history of gender verification tests in international sport 
competitions).  
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would choose is not the same as excluding them from competing. All qualified 
individuals are given an opportunity to compete regardless of their sex, gender, 
or gender identity, even if they are not free to choose whether they can 
participate in the men’s or women’s competition. 
This argument misunderstands the objection, especially as it pertains to rights 
that protect gender identity and expression. The right to recognition and 
treatment consistent with an individual’s expressed gender identity is violated 
when an athlete is channeled into a competitor class that contradicts the 
individual’s chosen identity. The right is also violated when an athlete is subjected 
to testing to determine whether the individual should be permitted to compete in 
the category with which they identify. Forcing transgender athletes to undergo 
sex testing could be thought to constitute wrongful discrimination because such 
a practice would subject such individuals to special burdens to demonstrate 
eligibility to which others are not and would bespeak disrespect for their 
expressed gender identity.41 
These concerns, if taken seriously, have controversial implications for 
competitive sport. If the traditional categories of men’s and women’s 
competitions are retained, one could argue that respect for gender identity 
requires nothing less than making all eligibility decisions on the basis of self-
determination, with no physical testing imposed—except to enforce antidoping 
restrictions. In effect, under this approach, the paradigm of sex segregation would 
be converted into one of gender segregation, with every individual’s applicable 
gender classification being a matter of autonomous self-determination. 
A likely objection to such a regime is that it would open the door for 
individuals who identify as women but who possess the characteristics of 
biological males to compete as women. Such individuals could then dominate the 
sport.42 This would undermine the point of having sex segregated competitions in 
the first place, which is, again, to ensure that women have equal opportunities to 
enjoy the benefits associated with competitive sport, including those associated 
with winning. 
This line of response to a gender-based classification system arguably misses 
the point and fails to take gender identity anti-discrimination rights seriously. The 
notion that self-determined gender-based classifications in sport would 
undermine the goal of empowering, promoting, and recognizing the 
achievements of women in sport implicitly assumes that individuals who identify 
as women but have sex characteristics associated with male biology are not really 
women, or are not the kind of women intended to benefit from sex segregation.43 
 
 41.  See Mari Mikkola, Discrimination and Trans Identities, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
THE ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at 287, 293–94.  
 42.  See Leong, supra note 40, at 23 (discussing the hypothesized problem). 
 43.  It is worth adding that for those who would defend separate women’s sports on the basis of 
values external to sport, such as equalization of women’s opportunities, it is then illogical to claim that 
gender identity simply does not matter. Strictly speaking, women’s equality may not matter, either, from 
the viewpoint of the internal values of sport. If one relies on values external to sport in order to justify 
sex segregation, one cannot simply say that considerations of gender identity discrimination are flatly 
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This sort of distinction between “real” women and others who “merely” identify 
as women is at odds with an attitude of genuine respect for gender identity and 
expression.44 
It may—or may not—be true that if athletes who identify as women but have 
physical advantages associated with male biology were allowed to compete as 
women, such athletes would dominate women’s competitive sport. This might be 
perceived as in some way unfair from the perspective of some competitors or the 
public. But fairness in sport is arguably a function of the rules, not vice versa.45 
The intuition that it would be unfair for a transgender woman to compete against 
women who have female sex characteristics may simply presuppose traditional 
sex segregation as the true paradigm of competition. If the question is whether 
the rules of competition should be changed in order to respect the rights of those 
who identify as women, it is not clear that the predicted outcome of transgender 
success in women’s competitions can be presented, without objectionable 
circularity, as a fairness challenge to a pure self-identification regime.46 It is, 
rather, a claim rooted in the internal value of ensuring that competitions take 
place among participants who are well-matched. The point is that predictions of 
transgender dominance in a self-determination regime do not directly answer the 
external objection that the current system of sex-based segregation may fail to 
respect rights of gender identity and expression. A more responsive rejoinder 
would show how a sex-based segregation system might in fact be implemented to 
respect such rights or, from a more consequentialist perspective, show how a sex-
based segregation regime would ultimately be for the benefit of all competitors, 
regardless of sex status or gender identity. 
Another solution addressing the treatment of transgender athletes might be 
to replace explicit sex- or gender-related classifications with formally sex- and 
gender-neutral classification criteria, such as weight, muscle mass, bioavailable 
testosterone, or perhaps some measure of demonstrated performance ability. In 
other words, the paradigm of men’s and women’s sport would be replaced with, 
for example, high testosterone and low testosterone classes. From an internal 
sport perspective that prioritizes the quality of competition, a sex- and gender-
neutral classification system might accomplish the main goals of the traditional 
approach. Apart from practical issues of implementation, such as the means of 
verifying eligibility, a classification system that is formally independent of sex and 
gender might be a theoretically plausible alternative. 
Although such a system could solve the problem of equalizing participation 
opportunities for all individuals, one might worry about how a formally neutral 
classification system would interact with entrenched societal attitudes relating to 
 
irrelevant just because such values are external to sport. If sex segregation is justified on the basis of 
external considerations, then such considerations should also inform questions about the proper use of 
gender classifications in sport. 
 44.  See Mikkola, supra note 41, at 294. 
 45.  See Loland, supra note 6, at 99–100. 
 46.  Cf. id. at 109 (“Justifying a rule by reference to the wrongness of breaking it implies logical 
circularity and is invalid.”).  
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sex and gender. Presumably, in order for a formally neutral system to yield the 
fundamental benefits of a sex-segregated system, its classifications would have to 
closely track the traditional sex-based categories of male and female. As a result, 
any new technical classification system, whatever the chosen criteria or metrics, 
could be publicly perceived as a veiled proxy for, or even just a relabeling of, the 
traditional categories of male and female or man and woman. This is potentially 
worrisome because the result might be that the neutral functional classifications, 
insofar as they could be mapped directly onto traditional notions of sex and 
gender, might have a tendency to reinforce essentialistic attitudes about who 
truly counts as a man or a woman. If the categories of men and women were 
replaced with classifications based on measures of bioavailable testosterone, and 
the resulting classes remained largely identifiable as men and women, the social 
consequence might be a reinforcement of the idea that individuals with high 
testosterone are really men, no matter how they may identify, and those with a 
lower testosterone level are really women, no matter how they may identify. 
Thus, a sex- and gender-neutral testing regime could fuel socially persistent 
attitudes that biology is the ultimate determinant of whether someone is really a 
woman or a man. 
To be clear, this concern is more of a comment on the difficulty of changing 
entrenched social attitudes than on the plausibility of sex- or gender-neutral 
technical classifications, which of course already exist in some sports—for 
instance, weight classes in boxing and wrestling. That difficulty is particularly 
acute in the context of sport because the culture of competitive sport is deeply 
entangled with societal norms and assumptions about sex and gender. Not only 
are some sports strongly gendered—for example, football is for men and 
rhythmic gymnastics is for women—but sport also informs particular conceptions 
of gender. Playing football and baseball may be part of a canonical notion of 
masculinity. The concept of gender may not fully derive from practices in sport, 
but the ways in which men and women are seen as different in competitive sport 
contribute to what it means to be a man or a woman in society. Because of this 
entanglement, sport cannot recuse itself from gender issues. In this sense—and 
contrary to the opening sentence of this article—sport cannot transcend social 
categories. To the extent that society still struggles with issues of gender identity 
discrimination, sport’s stance on the proper treatment of transgender competitors 




There are strong reasons to conclude that some form of sex segregation or its 
functional equivalent is necessary to equalize opportunities to participate in and 
enjoy the full benefits of competitive sport, at least at elite levels. From the 
 
 47.  See Tännsjö, supra note 9, at 356–57.  
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perspective of values internal to sport, this goal can be achieved by any 
classification that satisfies the “competitive desideratum”48 of allowing outcomes 
to be a measure of relative excellence among well matched competitors. As far 
as the institutions of sport are concerned, it should not matter what classification 
is chosen as long as eligibility procedures can be fairly implemented. But because 
the way in which men and women are separated in competitive sport is so 
entangled with societal concepts of gender, classification schemes in sport 
implicate external issues of gender equality and discrimination, including difficult 
questions about the treatment of transgender persons. No solution seems 
immune from worry. Classic sex segregation systems that determine eligibility for 
a men’s or women’s competition on the basis of being biologically male or female 
arguably fail to respect basic anti-discrimination rights that protect gender 
identity and expression. A gender-segregated regime based purely on 
autonomous self-identification could solve the problem of respecting anti-
discrimination rights, but it might be inconsistent with competitive desiderata 
embedded in values internal to sport. Alternative classification schemes based on 
biological or physiological markers might seem to provide a means to sidestep 
thorny issues of gender, but in fact they could fuel a sort of gender essentialism 
that would be harmful to progress in expanding societal recognition of rights of 
gender identity and expression. 
There is, then, no clear or easy solution. But what is important to recognize is 
that the hard—normative, ethical—questions are less about the biology of sex 
and sport than they are about the extent to which society expects the practices of 
sport to fully live up to, and indeed to help promote, progressive social attitudes 
regarding sex and gender. 
 
 
 48.  Berman, supra note 21, at 1358. 
